Optimal vaccination strategies and rational behaviour in seasonal epidemics

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Publication:338339

DOI10.1007/S00285-016-0997-1zbMATH Open1350.92050arXiv1507.02940OpenAlexW2594183829WikidataQ40727222 ScholiaQ40727222MaRDI QIDQ338339FDOQ338339


Authors: Paulo Doutor, Paula Rodrigues, Maria do Céu Soares, Fabio A. C. C. Chalub Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 4 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider a SIR model with temporary immunity and time dependent transmission rate. We assume time dependent vaccination which confers the same immunity as natural infection. We study two types of vaccination strategies: i) optimal vaccination, in the sense that it minimizes the effort of vaccination in the set of vaccination strategies for which, for any sufficiently small perturbation of the disease free state, the number of infectious individuals is monotonically decreasing; ii) Nash-equilibria strategies where all individuals simultaneously minimize the joint risk of vaccination versus the risk of the disease. The former case corresponds to an optimal solution for mandatory vaccinations, while the second correspond to the equilibrium to be expected if vaccination is fully voluntary. We are able to show the existence of both an optimal and Nash strategies in a general setting. In general, these strategies will not be functions but Radon measures. For specific forms of the transmission rate, we provide explicit formulas for the optimal and the Nash vaccination strategies.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02940




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