Evolution of stinginess and generosity in finite populations
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Publication:2404006
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Cites work
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5136073 (Why is no real title available?)
- Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- Mixed strategy under generalized public goods games
- Perfect reciprocity is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
- The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes
- The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
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