Coevolution of nonlinear group interactions and strategies in well-mixed and structured populations
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Publication:1648930
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.12.004zbMath1400.92455OpenAlexW2771910245WikidataQ47267547 ScholiaQ47267547MaRDI QIDQ1648930
Publication date: 5 July 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.12.004
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (5)
Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics under asymmetric information ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with nonlinear environment feedback in repeated public goods game ⋮ Replicator dynamics for involution in an infinite well-mixed population ⋮ An improved social force model for pedestrian dynamics in shipwrecks ⋮ Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game
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