Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.07.022MaRDI QIDQ1786393zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jeromos Vukov, Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco

Publication date 24 September 2018

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.022

zbMATH Keywords

complex networksevolution of cooperationevolutionary game theorypublic goods gamestructured populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Small world graphs, complex networks (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C82) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Heterogeneous investments induced by historical payoffs promote cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with common resource dynamics
• Effect of reputation-based heterogeneous investment on cooperation in spatial public goods game
• Individual behavior and social wealth in the spatial public goods game
• The roles of heterogeneous investment mechanism in the public goods game on scale-free networks

Cites work

• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1866312 (Why is no real title available?)
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• Statistics of Kagomé Lattice
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The Structure and Function of Complex Networks

Cited in

(10)

• Impact of shill intervention on the evolution of cooperation
• The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies
• Dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift games in structured populations
• Rewarding endowments lead to a win-win in the evolution of public cooperation and the accumulation of common resources
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Evolutionary dynamics of synergistic and discounted group interactions in structured populations
• Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
• Preventing the tragedy of the commons through punishment of over-consumers and encouragement of under-consumers
• Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula
• Networks beyond pairwise interactions: structure and dynamics

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