Impact of shill intervention on the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2015.04.013zbMath1400.91075OpenAlexW1981267108MaRDI QIDQ1618570

Changhao Sun, HaiBin Duan

Publication date: 13 November 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2015.04.013

zbMATH Keywords

public goods gamescale free networksoft controlcooperation evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evolving cooperation
• Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
• Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
• Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments
• Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation
• Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Dynamic noise from action errors enhances network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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