Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics

DOI10.3934/jdg.2014.1.485zbMath1332.91025OpenAlexW2333782858MaRDI QIDQ482549

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 5 January 2015

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2014.1.485

zbMATH Keywords

local stabilityevolutionary game theorystrict equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Attractors and repellers of smooth dynamical systems and their topological structure (37C70) Stability theory for smooth dynamical systems (37C75) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications, A myopic adjustment process for mean field games with finite state and action space, Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics, Tributes to Bill Sandholm

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