Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957zbMath1430.91021OpenAlexW2982266281MaRDI QIDQ2288526

Luis R. Izquierdo, William H. Sandholm, Segismundo S. Izquierdo

Publication date: 20 January 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic stabilityevolutionary game dynamicssampling dynamicsbest experienced payoff dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (9)

Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior ⋮ Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Stable sampling in repeated games ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game

Uses Software

• ABED
• EvoDyn-3s

Cites Work

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• Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games

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