Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
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Publication:2231400
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105174zbMath1471.91059arXiv2005.05779OpenAlexW3194664389MaRDI QIDQ2231400
Yuval Heller, Igal Milchtaich, Srinivas Arigapudi
Publication date: 29 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05779
Related Items (5)
Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior ⋮ Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling ⋮ Stable sampling in repeated games
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