Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
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Publication:1651806
DOI10.3390/G6030299zbMATH Open1403.91088OpenAlexW3124970167MaRDI QIDQ1651806FDOQ1651806
Authors: Juan Camilo Cárdenas, César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi 
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299
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Cites Work
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
- A theory of reciprocity
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
Cited In (11)
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option
- Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stable biased sampling
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
- Common pool equities: An arbitrage based non-cooperative solution to the common pool resource problem
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
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