Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

DOI10.3390/G6030299zbMath1403.91088OpenAlexW3124970167MaRDI QIDQ1651806

Juan Camilo Cárdenas, César Mantilla, Rajiv Sethi

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6030299

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsquantal response equilibriumcommon pool resource gamessampling equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (9)

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Stable sampling in repeated games ⋮ Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics

Cites Work

• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
• A theory of reciprocity
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

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