A maximum principle for frequency dependent selection

DOI10.1016/0025-5564(87)90091-5MaRDI QIDQ1088945zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karl Sigmund

Publication date 1987

Published in Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-5564(87)90091-5

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game dynamicsfrequency dependent selection equationgenetic modelmaximum principlemixtures of two alternativespopulation geneticsShahshahani gradient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Review text

If the evolutionary game dynamics of a strategic model is a Shahshahani gradient, then so is the corresponding frequency dependent selection equation of the genetic model. In particular, a maximum principle is valid whenever the phenotypes are mixtures of two alternatives.

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Cites work

• A new mathematical framework for the study of linkage and selection
• Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and viability selection in Mendelian populations
• Evolutionarily stable strategies in diploid populations with general inheritance patterns
• Evolutionarily stable strategies of diploid populations with semi-dominant inheritance patterns
• Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models
• Game dynamics in Mendelian populations
• Game dynamics, mixed strategies, and gradient systems
• Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3920272 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3922439 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3683431 (Why is no real title available?)
• Models of the evolution of altruism
• The ``battle of the sexes: A genetic model with limit cycle behavior
• The selection mutation equation

Cited in

(9)

• Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games
• On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
• Strategy abundance in evolutionary many-player games with multiple strategies
• Gradient flow formulations of discrete and continuous evolutionary models: a unifying perspective
• Evolutionary multiplayer games
• Adaptive fitness landscape for replicator systems: to maximize or not to maximize
• A generalization of Pontryagin's maximum principle for dynamic evolutionary games among relatives
• Maximization principles for frequency-dependent selection. II: The one-locus multiallele case
• Maximization principles for frequency-dependent selection. I: The one-locus two-allele case

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