On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0148-0zbMATH Open1348.91032DBLPjournals/dga/DuongH16arXiv1408.3850OpenAlexW2034641272WikidataQ59902354 ScholiaQ59902354MaRDI QIDQ338215FDOQ338215

Authors: Manh Hong Duong, The Anh Han 

Publication date: 4 November 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the mean number $E(n,d)$ of internal equilibria in a general $d$-player $n$-strategy evolutionary game where the agents' payoffs are normally distributed. First, we give a computationally implementable formula for the general case. Next we characterize the asymptotic behavior of $E(2,d)$, estimating its lower and upper bounds as $d$ increases. Two important consequences are obtained from this analysis. On the one hand, we show that in both cases the probability of seeing the maximal possible number of equilibria tends to zero when $d$ or $n$ respectively goes to infinity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that the expected number of stable equilibria is bounded within a certain interval. Finally, for larger $n$ and $d$, numerical results are provided and discussed.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.3850

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zbMATH Keywords

random polynomialsevolutionary gamemulti-player gamesmultiple strategiesnumber of equilibriarandom games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (10)

• On the expected number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games with correlated payoff matrix
• On the expected number of real roots of random polynomials arising from evolutionary game theory
• On equilibrium properties of the replicator-mutator equation in deterministic and random games
• The frequency of convergent games under best-response dynamics
• Persistence probability of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory
• Strategy abundance in \(2\times 2\) games for arbitrary mutation rates
• Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games
• On the distribution of the number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games
• On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
• Evolution of cooperation in spatio-temporal evolutionary games with public goods feedback

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