Computational complexity of multi-player evolutionarily stable strategies

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-79416-3_1MaRDI QIDQ2117070zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manon Blanc, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen

Publication date 21 March 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.07407

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

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Cited in

(4)

• The complexity of the Hausdorff distance
• On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game
• Beyond the Existential Theory of the Reals
• Computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in win-lose multi-player games

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