Computational complexity of multi-player evolutionarily stable strategies

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-79416-3_1OpenAlexW3176430832MaRDI QIDQ2117070FDOQ2117070

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Manon Blanc

Publication date: 21 March 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.07407

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

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Cited In (4)

• The complexity of the Hausdorff distance
• On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game
• Beyond the Existential Theory of the Reals
• Computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in win-lose multi-player games

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