The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies
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Publication:926196
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0095-0zbMath1147.91005OpenAlexW2033259331MaRDI QIDQ926196
Kousha Etessami, Andreas Lochbihler
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0095-0
Nash equilibriaGame theoryComputational complexityEvolutionarily stable strategiesEvolutionary biology
Related Items (8)
Existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Remains Hard to Decide for a Wide Range of Payoff Values ⋮ The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements ⋮ Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective ⋮ The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ⋮ Infection and immunization: a new class of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ The computational complexity of evolutionarily stable strategies ⋮ Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation ⋮ Computational complexity of multi-player evolutionarily stable strategies
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