Limit cycles sparked by mutation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

DOI10.1142/S0218127414300353zbMATH Open1305.34079arXiv1501.05715OpenAlexW1998232562WikidataQ56913048 ScholiaQ56913048MaRDI QIDQ5498596FDOQ5498596

Danielle F. P. Toupo, Steven Strogatz, David G. Rand

Publication date: 10 February 2015

Published in: International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos in Applied Sciences and Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We explore a replicator-mutator model of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma involving three strategies: always cooperate (ALLC), always defect (ALLD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). The dynamics resulting from single unidirectional mutations are considered, with detailed results presented for the mutations TFT $ightarrow$ ALLC and ALLD $ightarrow$ ALLC. For certain combinations of parameters, given by the mutation rate $mu$ and the complexity cost $c$ of playing tit-for-tat, we find that the population settles into limit cycle oscillations, with the relative abundance of ALLC, ALLD, and TFT cycling periodically. Surprisingly, these oscillations can occur for unidirectional mutations between any two strategies. In each case, the limit cycles are created and destroyed by supercritical Hopf and homoclinic bifurcations, organized by a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation. Our results suggest that stable oscillations are a robust aspect of a world of ALLC, ALLD, and costly TFT; the existence of cycles does not depend on the details of assumptions of how mutation is implemented.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05715

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zbMATH Keywords

limit cycleevolutionary game theorybifurcation analysisreplicator-mutator model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Qualitative investigation and simulation of ordinary differential equation models (34C60) Dynamical systems in biology (37N25) Topological structure of integral curves, singular points, limit cycles of ordinary differential equations (34C05) Bifurcation theory for ordinary differential equations (34C23) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
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• Hopf Bifurcations and Limit Cycles in Evolutionary Network Dynamics
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• Alternate Models of Replicator Dynamics

Cited In (4)

• Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control
• Allee effect induced diversity in evolutionary dynamics
• Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics
• Bifurcation analysis of three-strategy imitative dynamics with mutations

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