Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors
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Publication:615487
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2008.04.001zbMATH Open1210.92012OpenAlexW2013856573WikidataQ50791045 ScholiaQ50791045MaRDI QIDQ615487FDOQ615487
Authors: Laureano Castro, Miguel Toro 
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2008.04.001
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Cites Work
Cited In (10)
- Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
- Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
- Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma with self-inhibition
- On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics
- The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
- Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
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