Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2008.04.001zbMATH Open1210.92012OpenAlexW2013856573WikidataQ50791045 ScholiaQ50791045MaRDI QIDQ615487FDOQ615487

Laureano Castro, Miguel Toro

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2008.04.001

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoner's dilemmalonerTit for Tat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• The Evolution of Cooperation

Cited In (6)

• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
• Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
• Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma with self-inhibition
• Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the prisoner's dilemma game
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action

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