Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2008.04.001zbMATH Open1210.92012OpenAlexW2013856573WikidataQ50791045 ScholiaQ50791045MaRDI QIDQ615487FDOQ615487

Authors Laureano Castro, Miguel Toro

Publication date 5 January 2011

Published in Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2008.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoner's dilemmalonerTit for Tat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• The evolution of cooperation
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cited in

(10)

• Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games
• The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
• The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation
• Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial prisoner's dilemma with self-inhibition
• On the coexistence of cooperators, defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types

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