Distinguishing punishing costly signals from nonpunishing costly signals can facilitate the emergence of altruistic punishment

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2019.124945MaRDI QIDQ2287693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors He Niu, Yuyou Chen, Hang Ye, Hong Zhang, Yan Li, Shu Chen

Publication date 21 January 2020

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.124945

zbMATH Keywords

public goodscostly signalingaltruistic punishmentsecond-order social dilemmasocial attention holding power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
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Cites work

• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cited in

(2)

• Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games
• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games

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