Distinguishing punishing costly signals from nonpunishing costly signals can facilitate the emergence of altruistic punishment

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2019.124945zbMATH Open1433.91036OpenAlexW2995073242WikidataQ115792219 ScholiaQ115792219MaRDI QIDQ2287693FDOQ2287693

Authors: He Niu, Yuyou Chen, Hang Ye, Hong Zhang, Yan Li, Shu Chen 

Publication date: 21 January 2020

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.124945

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zbMATH Keywords

public goodscostly signalingaltruistic punishmentsecond-order social dilemmasocial attention holding power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation

Cited In (1)

• Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games

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