A 2 2 -best response stochastic two-step game

zbMATH Open1228.91010MaRDI QIDQ3172362FDOQ3172362

Authors: A. V. Raigorodskaya 

Publication date: 5 October 2011

Full work available at URL: http://mathnet.ru/eng/mgta49

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zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamesrepeated gamesbest response

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (1)

• Choosing the equilibrium behavior in an infinitely repeated \(2 \times 2\) game for conservative and innovative gamers

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