A dynamic foundation of the Rawlsian maxmin criterion
DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0026-3zbMATH Open1307.91134OpenAlexW2041131056WikidataQ125886447 ScholiaQ125886447MaRDI QIDQ367470FDOQ367470
Authors: In-Koo Cho, Akihiko Matsui 
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0026-3
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2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete-time games (91A50) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- The bargaining problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
- Evolving aspirations and cooperation
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Voice matters in a dictator game
- Learning aspiration in repeated games
- Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
Cited In (3)
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