Voice matters in a dictator game
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Publication:1020586
DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9168-yzbMath1161.91351MaRDI QIDQ1020586
Toshiji Kawagoe, Akihiko Matsui, Tetsuo Yamamori, Kazuhiko Kato
Publication date: 29 May 2009
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9168-y
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