Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
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Publication:1927571
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.011zbMath1254.91093OpenAlexW2033130524MaRDI QIDQ1927571
Kendra N. McLeish, Robert J. Oxoby
Publication date: 1 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.011
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