Exploding Offers Can Blow Up in More Than One Way

DOI10.1287/DECA.2014.0297zbMath1398.91378OpenAlexW3124706432MaRDI QIDQ4691979

Nelson Lau, Ilia Tsetlin, Yakov Bart, J. Neil Bearden

Publication date: 24 October 2018

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2014.0297

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsdeadlinesjob searchexploding offersultimatumsfirm employment decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Deadlines, Offer Timing, and the Search for Alternatives

Cites Work

• The hot versus cold effect in a simple bargaining experiment
• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• On perceptions of fairness: the role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games
• Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
• Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments
• Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
• Exploding Offers

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