Exploding Offers Can Blow Up in More Than One Way
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Publication:4691979
DOI10.1287/DECA.2014.0297zbMath1398.91378OpenAlexW3124706432MaRDI QIDQ4691979
Nelson Lau, Ilia Tsetlin, Yakov Bart, J. Neil Bearden
Publication date: 24 October 2018
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2014.0297
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Cites Work
- The hot versus cold effect in a simple bargaining experiment
- Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
- On perceptions of fairness: the role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games
- Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
- Outside options and social comparison in three-player ultimatum game experiments
- Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
- Exploding Offers
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