Social opportunities and the evolution of fairness
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Publication:1786532
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.07.031zbMATH Open1397.91059OpenAlexW2111721686WikidataQ39708967 ScholiaQ39708967MaRDI QIDQ1786532FDOQ1786532
Authors: Jean-Baptiste André, Nicolas Baumard
Publication date: 24 September 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.031
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Cites Work
- Optimal foraging, the marginal value theorem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
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Cited In (12)
- Coevolution of fairness and spite on stochastic dynamics networks
- Coevolution of spatial ultimatum game and link weight promotes fairness
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm
- Generosity, selfishness and exploitation as optimal greedy strategies for resource sharing
- Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
- The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game
- Pinning control of social fairness in the ultimatum game
- Partner choice promotes cooperation: the two faces of testing with agent-based models
- A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution
- Effects of game willingness on the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game
- Modelling the emergence of an egalitarian society in the \(n\)-player game framework
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