Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule

DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110421zbMath1496.91017OpenAlexW3099400369MaRDI QIDQ2128187

Zhixue He, Chen Shen, Yini Geng, Lei Shi

Publication date: 21 April 2022

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110421

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmobilityprisoner's dilemma gameextortion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Options for mobility and network reciprocity to jointly yield robust cooperation in social dilemmas, Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment, Modeling the social dilemma of involution on a square lattice

Cites Work

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