Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032zbMath1343.91033OpenAlexW2228824121WikidataQ47586669 ScholiaQ47586669MaRDI QIDQ306614

Alexandros Rigos, Heinrich H. Nax

Publication date: 1 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65447/

zbMATH Keywords

cooperation(co-)evolutionassortativitydemocratic consensus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Evolutionary games and matching rules, On the stability of couples, On the spatial diffusion of cooperation with endogenous matching institutions, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Effect of strategy-assortativity on investor sharing games in the market, Contribution-based grouping under noise, Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness, Labelling, homophily and preference evolution, Political institutions and the evolution of character traits, Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions, Entitlement to assort: democracy, compromise culture and economic stability, Evolution of preferences in structured populations: genes, guns, and culture, Matching markets and cultural selection

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