On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2MaRDI QIDQ1802942zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ulrich Kamecke

Publication date 29 June 1993

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2

zbMATH Keywords

continuum of allocationscore of a linear assignment problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• The nonatomic assignment model
• The core and related solution concepts for infinite assignment games
• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194817 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3313523 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3357080 (Why is no real title available?)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
• Non-cooperative matching games
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(5)

• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• On the linear assignment problem for special matrices
• Some fixed-point results for the dynamic assignment problem
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets

This page was built for publication: On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1802942)