On the uniqueness of the solution to a large linear assignment problem
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Publication:1802942
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2zbMATH Open0770.90009OpenAlexW2031699640WikidataQ127884720 ScholiaQ127884720MaRDI QIDQ1802942FDOQ1802942
Authors: Ulrich Kamecke
Publication date: 29 June 1993
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90024-2
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Cites Work
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