Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
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Publication:533916
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003zbMath1211.91076OpenAlexW2055501687MaRDI QIDQ533916
Publication date: 10 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.01.003
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Applications of functional analysis in optimization, convex analysis, mathematical programming, economics (46N10) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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