Bargaining in cooperative games

DOI10.1007/BF01254537zbMath0661.90107MaRDI QIDQ1113816

William R. Zame, Elaine Bennett

Publication date: 1988

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

aspiration bargaining set; cooperative games without sidepayments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games, Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching, Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games, An extension of the KKMS theorem, The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium, Multilateral bargaining problems, In memoriam Elaine Bennett (1951-1995), A demand adjustment process, On coalition formation: durable coalition structures., The partnered core of a game with side payments, Unnamed Item, USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION, COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY, Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
• A cardinal bargaining set for games without side payments
• Multilateral bargaining problems
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Nontransferable Utility Games and Markets: Some Examples and the Harsanyi Solution
• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
• An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
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