Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
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Publication:1108209
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90277-3zbMath0653.90099OpenAlexW2086950851WikidataQ122937533 ScholiaQ122937533MaRDI QIDQ1108209
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90277-3
Related Items (11)
On aspiration solutions in predicting coalition formation in cooperative games ⋮ Multilateral bargaining problems ⋮ In memoriam Elaine Bennett (1951-1995) ⋮ Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets ⋮ Bargaining in cooperative games ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers. ⋮ Propaedeutics of strategic theories of economic integration ⋮ Households, markets and public choice ⋮ Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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