The partnered core of a game with side payments

DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0651-9zbMath1287.91014MaRDI QIDQ2450086

Eyal Winter, Myrna Holtz Wooders, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15874

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

An extension of the KKMS theorem, The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium, An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games

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