The hypercore on social choice problem

DOI10.1016/S0453-4514(99)80011-8MaRDI QIDQ4538139zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hisakazu Nishino, Masayoshi Mizutani, Yuuji Satoh, Wentian Cui

Publication date 11 July 2002

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0453-4514(99)80011-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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