The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(81)90002-1MaRDI QIDQ1152837zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ishai Oren

Publication date 1981

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(81)90002-1

zbMATH Keywords

anonymous exactly strongly consistent social choice functionexistenceminimal blocking coalitionmonotonicityuniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Consistent Voting Systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3394154 (Why is no real title available?)
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

Cited in

(9)

• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• The capacity of a committee
• Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
• Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

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