A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions

DOI10.1007/BF00126344MaRDI QIDQ1252144zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manimay Sengupta, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date 1979

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126344

zbMATH Keywords

Group Decision FunctionsIndividual PreferencesNash-StabilitySocial Choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
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• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• PROOF OF PROFESSOR SAMUELSON'S CONJECTURE ON THE STABILITY
• Social choice and individual values
• Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting

Cited in

(4)

• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Special domains and nonmanipulability
• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
• Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions

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