Stability in Voting
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(36)- Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
- The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
- The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
- An interview with Michael Dummett: From analytical philosophy to voting analysis and beyond
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
- Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
- Some strategic properties of plurality and majority voting
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
- The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
- Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
- Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
- The strategy-proof social choice functions
- Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450018 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- A further result on the core of voting games
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory
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