On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
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(37)- Searching for equilibrium positions in a game of political competition with restrictions
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- Location models as models of product choice
- The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
- A group majority voting model of public good provision
- Smooth social choice
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Length and cycle equalization
- Abstentions and majority equilibrium
- Transitivity of preference on a smooth manifold of alternatives
- A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium
- Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- Endogenously determined price rigidities
- The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
- Toward a 50\%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
- A model of political parties
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
- Generalized Sen-Coherence and existence of preferred with probability at least half winners
- Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
- Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
- Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics.
- Weak equilibrium in a spatial model
- Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models
- A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- A power rule for social choice
- Order restricted preferences and majority rule
- A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
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