Length and cycle equalization

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90019-3zbMath0473.90005OpenAlexW2015154753MaRDI QIDQ1159117

Ronald A. Heiner

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90019-3

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principletransitivitypreference cyclescollective choice methodscycle equalizationnon-manipulability properties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On some suggestions for having non-binary social choice functions
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• On Schwartz's rule
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Ranking functions and independence conditions
• Democratic preference functions
• FUNCTIONS OF A THEORY OF BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
• A Note on Single Peakedness
• Proof of a Conjecture in Social Choice
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule

This page was built for publication: Length and cycle equalization