Order restricted preferences and majority rule
The author considers the set \(R^*=\{R_ i\}\) \((i=1,2,...,n\); \(n\geq 3)\) of weak orders, specified by the set X of alternatives. A restriction on \(R^*\) is adopted, related to properties defined on all triples \(T\subset X\). The author introduces the notion ``order restriction for such a sort of restriction and abbreviates if by OR. He demonstrates that \(OR_ T\) is stronger than the value restriction and weaker than the single peakedness or single cavedness conditions and is equivalent to them in case indifferences are not allowed in the ordering. In conclusion the author discusses possible applications to economic models of the results obtained.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
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