Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
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Cites work
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Cited in
(15)- Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
- Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
- Structural instability of the core
- On the core of voting games
- Smooth social choice
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
- A ham sandwich theorem for general measures
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- A power rule for social choice
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms
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