Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(80)90006-3MaRDI QIDQ1138981zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman Schofield

Publication date 1980

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(80)90006-3

zbMATH Keywords

coresocial choicecycle setvoting gamegeneric propertiestransversality theoryinfinitesimal optima setnon-collegial voting gamesimple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson- Samuelson Welfare Function
• An exact sequence in differential topology
• Global analysis and economics. III: Pareto Optima and price equilibria
• Group Actions on Spin Manifolds
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
• Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
• Social choice and individual values
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• The singularities \(S_ 1^ q\)
• Thresholds in Pareto sets
• Why ethical measures of inequality need interpersonal comparisons

Cited in

(15)

• Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• Structural instability of the core
• On the core of voting games
• Smooth social choice
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• A ham sandwich theorem for general measures
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• A power rule for social choice
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms

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