Smooth social choice

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(89)90414-7MaRDI QIDQ1124504zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman Schofield

Publication date 1989

Published in Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90414-7

zbMATH Keywords

chaoscoreNakamura numbersmooth social choicevoting cyclesvoting rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper surveys results on the existence of a core of a voting rule under various specification of the space of alternatives. Let W be this space and n, the Nakamura number. When W is finite, there exists a core if and only if the cardinality of W is less than or equal to n-1. If W lies in a vector space of dimension dim(W), then there is a core if and only if dim(W) is less than or equal to n-2. For higher dimensional W, voting is generically chaotic, in the sense that voting cycles fill almost all of W.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(8)

• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
• Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• The \(C^1\) topology on the space of smooth preference profiles
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4183141 (Why is no real title available?)
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