Smooth social choice (Q1124504)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4112331
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
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| English | Smooth social choice |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4112331 |
Statements
Smooth social choice (English)
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1989
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This paper surveys results on the existence of a core of a voting rule under various specification of the space of alternatives. Let W be this space and n, the Nakamura number. When W is finite, there exists a core if and only if the cardinality of W is less than or equal to n-1. If W lies in a vector space of dimension dim(W), then there is a core if and only if dim(W) is less than or equal to n-2. For higher dimensional W, voting is generically chaotic, in the sense that voting cycles fill almost all of W.
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smooth social choice
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chaos
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core
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voting rule
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Nakamura number
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voting cycles
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0.8367607593536377
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0.7977424263954163
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0.7974020838737488
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0.7927082180976868
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