Instability of Simple Dynamic Games

DOI10.2307/2297259MaRDI QIDQ4186027zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman Schofield

Publication date 1978

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297259

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's Impossibility TheoremInstabilityPolitical ProcessesSimple Dynamic GamesSimple Majority Voting Game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(38)

• Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Structural instability of the core
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions
• Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
• Smooth social choice
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
• Structural instability of decision majority rules
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
• Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice
• Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter
• A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences
• Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
• On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the `chaos theorems' in a laboratory experiment
• The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
• The instability of instability of centered distributions
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• The dynamics of issue introduction: A model based on the politics of ideology
• Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• Gridlock or leadership in U.S. electoral politics
• Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
• Social Choice Theory
• The finagle point is close to the yolk
• Bayesian learning in fish wars: dynamic estimation of unknown states and private information
• A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
• The Condorcet dimension of metric spaces
• On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Existence of a multicameral core
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

This page was built for publication: Instability of Simple Dynamic Games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4186027)