The ``probability of a fit choice

DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0136-4zbMATH Open1279.91066OpenAlexW2082686812MaRDI QIDQ2375892FDOQ2375892

Authors: Norman Schofield 

Publication date: 25 June 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0136-4

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zbMATH Keywords

social choicedynamical modelsstochastic model of electionsthe ``heart as a social choice correpondence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• General elections modelled with infinitely many voters
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The tune in-and-out model: a random walk and its application to a presidential election survey
• Failure of an election is scientifically predictable!
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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