The ``probability of a fit choice
The author examines questions of finding a social choice in an election scheme, using a model that takes voter judgments into account. Rather than merely examining voter preferences, the model includes some random terms reflecting voters' perceptions of candidates. The paper reviews a number of variants of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem which can be used to prove the existence of equilbrium points in dynamic games and electoral situations. This includes pointing out a number of conditions under which such an equilibrium is guaranteed, as well as some examples of social dynamics under which no such equilibrium occurs. The concept of the ``heart of a social choice correspondence is introduced as a less restrictive notion of a solution to the equilibrium problem. Finally, the paper gives an analysis of the dynamics at play in the 2008 U.S. presidential election and discusses the effect of party extremists versus the impact of the population at large.
- Nash equilibrium in multiparty competition with ``stochastic voters
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3891044
- Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
- A chaotic Exploration of Aggregation Paradoxes
- A generalization of Tychonoff's fixed point theorem
- A theory of voting in large elections
- A topological invariant for competetive markets
- Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow
- Differential Topology
- Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis
- Equilibria in markets with a Riesz space of commodities
- Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
- Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences
- Equilibrium in abstract political economies: With an application to a public good economy with voting
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel
- Excess demand functions
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium. A note on the 'new' existence theorems
- Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
- Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Global analysis and economics. II: Extension of a theorem of Debreu
- Global bifurcations and chaos. Analytical methods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2133811 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3475274 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1950480 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784402 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 773150 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405563 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3395596 (Why is no real title available?)
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Intersecting families of sets and the topology of cones in economics
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium with or without short sales
- Market arbitrage, social choice and the core
- MARKETS AND GAMES: A SIMPLE EQUIVALENCE AMONG THE CORE, EQUILIBRIUM AND LIMITED ARBITRAGE
- Mathematical complexity of simple economics.
- On the existence of maximal elements
- Price Dynamics, Social Choice, Voting Methods, Probability and Chaos
- Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Singularity theory of utility mappings - I: Degenerate maxima and Pareto optima
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- Structural stability on two-dimensional manifolds
- Structurally Stable Systems are not Dense
- The \(C^1\) topology on the space of smooth preference profiles
- The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
- The location of American presidential candidates: An empirical test of a new spatial model of elections
- The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective
- Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition
- The tune in-and-out model: a random walk and its application to a presidential election survey
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3891044 (Why is no real title available?)
- Failure of an election is scientifically predictable!
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2163487 (Why is no real title available?)
- General elections modelled with infinitely many voters
This page was built for publication: The ``probability of a fit choice
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2375892)
