The ``probability of a fit choice'' (Q2375892)

The author examines questions of finding a social choice in an election scheme, using a model that takes voter judgments into account. Rather than merely examining voter preferences, the model includes some random terms reflecting voters' perceptions of candidates. The paper reviews a number of variants of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem which can be used to prove the existence of equilbrium points in dynamic games and electoral situations. This includes pointing out a number of conditions under which such an equilibrium is guaranteed, as well as some examples of social dynamics under which no such equilibrium occurs. The concept of the ``heart'' of a social choice correspondence is introduced as a less restrictive notion of a solution to the equilibrium problem. Finally, the paper gives an analysis of the dynamics at play in the 2008 U.S. presidential election and discusses the effect of party extremists versus the impact of the population at large.