Equilibrium in abstract political economies: With an application to a public good economy with voting

DOI10.1007/BF00179097zbMATH Open0841.90008OpenAlexW2073650915MaRDI QIDQ1906016FDOQ1906016

Authors: Hideo Konishi 

Publication date: 24 July 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00179097

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zbMATH Keywords

collective choice ruleabstract political economyvoting core existence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited In (6)

• Voting over redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model under interdependent labor inputs
• Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy
• Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
• Coalitions and catastrophic climate change

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