Voting over redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model under interdependent labor inputs

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109206zbMATH Open1436.91079OpenAlexW3023194156MaRDI QIDQ777728FDOQ777728

Authors: Armando R. Lopez-Velasco 

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109206

Recommendations

• Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting, Lorenz curves and bargaining sets
• Relative consumption and majority voting: supplementing Oates' ``decentralization theorem
• Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation
• The equivalence of the cost share equilibria and the core of a voting game in a public goods economy
• Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production
• Equilibrium in abstract political economies: With an application to a public good economy with voting
• A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions
• Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
• Voting for redistribution under desert-sensitive altruism
• Existence of voting-market equilibria

zbMATH Keywords

redistributionmedian voterinterdependent laborMeltzer-Richard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• Bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions: a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply

Cited In (4)

• Social sampling, self-anchoring and redistribution
• Neoclassical production, scarcity of skills and Pareto distributions
• Voting for redistribution under desert-sensitive altruism
• Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates

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