Structural instability of decision majority rules

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90027-1MaRDI QIDQ1158070zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Graciela Chichilnisky

Publication date 1982

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90027-1

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystructural instabilityPareto conditiondecisive majority conditionsocial aggregation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 715014 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• An exact sequence in differential topology
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Smooth Preferences
• Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
• Social choice and individual values
• Social choice and the topology of spaces of preferences

Cited in

(4)

• The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator
• Topological social choice
• Community preferences and social choice
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox

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