Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
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(29)- Anonymity and continuous social choice
- Structural instability of decision majority rules
- Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements
- The Moebius strip and a social choice paradox
- Aggregation of utility and social choice: a topological characterization.
- Topological social choice
- A projection property and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
- Abstract aggregations and proximity preservation: an impossibility result
- Continuous-valued social choice
- Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium with or without short sales
- Social decision for a measure society
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- An axiomatic approach to finite means
- Kaplow-Shavell welfarism without continuity
- Bounded response of aggregated preferences
- Singularity and Arrow's paradox
- Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives
- A model of growth with living capital
- Borda rule and Arrow's independence condition in finite societies
- Is a continuous rational social aggregation impossible on continuum spaces?
- Continuous social decision procedures
- Utility functions for Debreu's 'excess demands'
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences
- A reformulation of Chichilnisky's impossibility theorem
- On the robustness of the impossibility result in the topological approach to social choice
- Topological social choice: Reply to Le Breton and Uriarte
- Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
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