Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0424-2MaRDI QIDQ976965zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date 16 June 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96013

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
• Disposing dictators, demystifying voting paradoxes. Social choice analysis
• More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
• Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
• Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
• Social choice and individual values
• Social compromise and social metrics
• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
• The Libertarian resolution of the Paretian liberal paradox
• The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator

Cited in

(5)

• Note on compromise axiom
• A unifying model to measure consensus solutions in a society
• Elites and Secret Handshakes Versus Metrics and Rule-Based Acclamation: A Comment on “Measuring the Unmeasurable”
• Bargaining solutions as social compromises
• A ratio scale metric and the compatibility of ratio scales: The possibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem

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