Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0424-2zbMATH Open1230.91041OpenAlexW2052452987MaRDI QIDQ976965FDOQ976965

Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96013

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
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• Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity
• The topological equivalence of the Pareto condition and the existence of a dictator
• The Libertarian resolution of the Paretian liberal paradox
• Social compromise and social metrics
• Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
• Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
• Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
• Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
• More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice

Cited In (4)

• Elites and Secret Handshakes Versus Metrics and Rule-Based Acclamation: A Comment on “Measuring the Unmeasurable”
• A ratio scale metric and the compatibility of ratio scales: The possibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• A unifying model to measure consensus solutions in a society
• Bargaining solutions as social compromises

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