Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0622-9zbMATH Open1096.91011OpenAlexW2012697524MaRDI QIDQ2494017FDOQ2494017

Authors: Donald G. Saari, Anne Petron 

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0622-9

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryprisoner's dilemmaparadoxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cited In (14)

• From decision problems to dethroned dictators
• Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
• Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
• Mathematical problem-solving in scientific practice
• A Production Theory Perspective on Collective Choice Theory
• Sen cycles and externalities
• Complexities of electing diverse committees
• Rights revisited, and limited
• Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
• Source of complexity in the social and managerial sciences: an extended Sen's theorem
• Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
• The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox
• Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the ``Coase theorem
• Complexity and the geometry of voting

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