Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0622-9zbMath1096.91011OpenAlexW2012697524MaRDI QIDQ2494017

Anne Petron, Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0622-9

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryparadoxesprisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (12)

Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Sen cycles and externalities ⋮ Mathematical problem-solving in scientific practice ⋮ Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems ⋮ Source of complexity in the social and managerial sciences: an extended Sen's theorem ⋮ From decision problems to dethroned dictators ⋮ Complexities of electing diverse committees ⋮ Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations ⋮ Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion' ⋮ Rights Revisited, and Limited ⋮ The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox ⋮ Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem

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