Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
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Publication:2386271
DOI10.1007/S003550050103zbMATH Open1066.91543OpenAlexW1964335176MaRDI QIDQ2386271FDOQ2386271
Authors: Donald G. Saari 
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1132.pdf
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- Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
- Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
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- Arrow's theorem and theory choice
- Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
- On some ordinal models for decision making under uncertainty
- The profile structure for Luce's choice axiom
- Sen's theorem for hierarchies
- Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Ordinal utility differences
- A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
- The ease of generating chaotic behavior in economics.
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