Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
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Publication:2386271
DOI10.1007/s003550050103zbMath1066.91543OpenAlexW1964335176MaRDI QIDQ2386271
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1132.pdf
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