Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2386271
Recommendations
Cited in
(23)- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- A positional version of Arrow's theorem
- Merging discrete evaluations
- Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
- Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
- The profile structure for Luce's choice axiom
- Ordinal utility differences
- Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
- On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
- Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
- A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
- The ease of generating chaotic behavior in economics.
- Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'
- Intransitive social indifference and the Arrow dilemma
- Pareto efficiency with spatial rights
- On some ordinal models for decision making under uncertainty
- Sen's proofs of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems
- How to choose a president, mayor, chair: Balinski and Laraki unpacked
- Singularity and Arrow's paradox
- Arrow's theorem and theory choice
- Abstention as an escape from arrow's theorem
- Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
- Sen's theorem for hierarchies
This page was built for publication: Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2386271)
