A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
Summary: Condorcet's voting paradox shows that pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical majority preferences. In a famous paper, \textit{A. K. Sen} [Econometrica 34, 491--499 (1966; Zbl 0149.17003), reprinted in A. K. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Oxford: Blackwell; The MIT Press (1982), Harvard University Press (1997)] identified a general condition on a profile of individual preference orderings, called triplewise value-restriction, which is sufficient for the avoidance of such cycles. This note aims to make Sen's result easily accessible. We provide an elementary proof of Sen's possibility theorem and a simple reformulation of Sen's condition. We discuss how Sen's condition is logically related to a number of precursors. Finally, we state a necessary and sufficient condition for the avoidance of cycles, and suggest that, although there is still some logical space between that condition and Sen's sufficient condition, Sen's condition cannot be further generalized in an appealing way.
- A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6612263 (Why is no real title available?)
- Generalized Sen-Coherence and existence of preferred with probability at least half winners
- Conditions on social-preference cycles
- A short proof of Deb's theorem on Schwartz's rule
- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Ranking judgments in Arrow's setting
This page was built for publication: A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q815024)
